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Comment  Alan J. Marcus
This chapter is a valuable contribution to the literature on the too-  often 
unacknowledged growth in explicit and implicit government guarantee pro-
grams. While the Federal Government did not originally provide explicit 
“full faith and credit” backing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt, its 
implicit support was, as Lucas and McDonald (henceforth, LM) point out, 
widely acknowledged and visibly apparent in the yields at which the two 
ﬁ  rms were able to issue their bonds. More recently, of course, that guarantee 
became explicit.
Lucas and McDonald estimate the ex-  ante present value in 2005 of the 
combined guarantee to the two ﬁ  rms at around $65 billion over twenty 
years. This is a considerable amount; moreover, as a mean, it is actually a 
conservative estimate of the government’s potential exposure. A value-  at-
  risk estimate focusing on bad-   or worst-  case scenarios obviously would be 
multiples of this value. When comparing this implicit guarantee with some 
of the others discussed in this volume, it is good to remember that the risks 
of some programs have been assessed by worst- case scenarios and others by 
midpoint estimates. By either standard, Freddie- Fannie guarantees must be 
ranked among the more important contingent government obligations, and 
a careful demonstration of this point is by itself an important contribution 
of the chapter.
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An even more important contribution of the model is the capability it 
provides for sensitivity analysis. Lucas and McDonald build behavioral 
assumptions regarding funding and asset management policy into their 
model. Among the more interesting features of their model is the ﬂ  exibility 
they allow for the response of asset volatility to ﬁ  nancial distress, the bank-
ruptcy trigger, and the response of liabilities to target leverage. They ﬁ  nd 
that the value of the guarantee is quite sensitive to some of these param-
eters, particularly the ones that link asset volatility to the ﬁ  nancial status 
of the ﬁ  rm. This sort of sensitivity analysis allows one to determine which 
sorts of behaviors provide the greatest potential for growth in government 
exposure and therefore to progress from passive risk measurement to active 
risk management.
Comparing the LM approach to other valuation studies based on yield 
spreads highlights its advantages and disadvantages. Valuation using yield 
spreads revalues outstanding debt using an estimate of the yield at which it 
would sell in the absence of the implied Federal guarantee. The predicted 
drop in the value of debt when it is priced at a nonguaranteed yield is the 
estimated value of the guarantee. The advantage of this approach compared 
to structural models like that of LM is that we can tie our valuation down to 
more or less observable market statistics—the yields at which government-
  sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt actually sells and the yields at which oth-
erwise comparable corporate debt sells. Passmore (2005) estimated that the 
implied federal guarantee reduced Freddie and Fannie debt yields by about 
40 basis points, corresponding to a guarantee value of around $150 billion. 
This approach to valuing the impact of the guarantee is far simpler than 
the option-  pricing approach used in LM. But that relative simplicity comes 
at a high price, since it is essentially a point estimate, and sheds limited 
light on the exposure of potential losses to changes in underlying economic 
conditions.
Lucas and McDonald’s more structural option- pricing model forces them 
to take a stand on harder issues. For example, they need to specify jump and 
diﬀusion parameters, decide how to model the bankruptcy trigger, and how 
to model ﬁ  rm behavior if it enters ﬁ  nancial distress. Any of these param-
eters are hard to estimate and inevitably are subject to second-  guessing and 
imprecision. But there is an advantage to this approach as well, for to truly 
understand the risk and the value of the government’s exposure we need to 
take a stand on these issues. If we learned anything from the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) debacle it is that sensitivity 
analysis is crucial, and that value is highly subject to behavioral assumptions, 
and in particular, to moral hazard.
While these valuation approaches diﬀer considerably, it would have been 
nice if LM’s base- case estimates (about $65 billion) had turned out closer to 
those derived from yield spreads (about $150 billion in Passmore’s study). 156        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
Lucas and McDonald note that part of this diﬀerence may be related to 
a feature that can only be captured in a multiperiod model such as theirs. 
In their model, a ﬁ  rm with a government guarantee may optimally choose 
not to default in some states that an uninsured ﬁ  rm would declare bank-
ruptcy. The insured ﬁ  rm is less apt to default because it has an incentive to 
preserve the value of the government’s future guarantees. This policy makes 
the value of the next-  period guarantee to the ﬁ  rm greater than the cost to 
the government.
In any case, these diﬀerences may be less extreme than they appear. 
Lucas and McDonald note that their guarantee value translates to a yield 
spread of about 20 to 30 basis points, compared to 40 basis points in Pass-
more. Part of the diﬀerence seems to be due to Passmore’s higher growth 
assumptions. More importantly, part of the yield spread may reﬂ  ect the 
special status and the higher liquidity of GSE debt rather than default risk. 
Moreover, Passmore notes that the yield spreads as well as other determi-
nants of guarantee value vary over time and that his estimates vary con-
siderably across parameter combinations, so perhaps these diﬀerences are 
within shouting distance.1 Nevertheless, even most of the LM sensitivity-
  analysis estimates are lower than those derived from than the seemingly 
simpler yield-  spread approach, so it may be worth considering whether 
there is some reason that the option pricing method seems to result in lower 
valuations.
Of course in a mechanical sense, LM could always ﬁ  nd parameters for 
which their valuation would match almost any other estimate, for example, 
by increasing volatility inputs, jump risk, funding policy, or the sensitivity 
of asset volatility to ﬁ  nancial distress. But their parameter choices do not 
strike me as particularly conservative. In particular, the quadrupling of asset 
volatility in periods of ﬁ  nancial distress (when assets fall below 1.01 times 
liabilities) seems suﬃciently aggressive.
Another possibility worth some consideration is that the LM estimates 
of asset volatility may be low. All option pricing models are driven by asset 
volatility, which LM infer from the volatility of equity. But neither Fannie 
nor Freddie have been particularly transparent. Lucas and McDonald note 
that little information was available on their interest-  rate hedging activities 
or eﬃcacy. The ﬁ  rms released “fair value balance sheets” accounting for the 
market value of their extensive derivatives positions only quarterly (Freddie) 
or annually (Fannie), and even then, outside observers had to rely on their 
1. Passmore obtains his estimate through a “simulation analysis” in which several inputs to 
the valuation formula such as growth rates, yield spreads, equity risk premia, and so on are 
allowed to take on multiple values. Therefore, he allows for a range of estimates. Note, however, 
that his simulation is of a very diﬀerent nature than that conducted in LM, which employs 
Monte Carlo analysis driven by stochastic evolution in asset value. Passmore’s approach does 
not specify a stochastic process for asset returns, and therefore does not answer questions about 
the sensitivity of guarantee value to changes in parameters such as asset volatility, nor does it 
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valuations, without any meaningful guidance as to their methodologies. 
This would be hard enough if one could have trusted their commitment to 
meaningful disclosure, but both ﬁ  rms had very troubling histories of earn-
ings management, particularly earnings smoothing, which at the least, cast 
doubt on any such commitment.
What if opacity and aggressive earnings- smoothing practices signiﬁ  cantly 
reduced ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c information? Speciﬁ  cally, what if lack of transparency 
meant that the market had only limited information about these ﬁ  rms? If so, 
stock price volatility may have reﬂ  ected the value impact of revealed infor-
mation, but not the full volatility of actual performance, most of which was 
not publicly observable. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) note that opacity can 
lead to a reduction in the ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c component of returns. Jin and Myers 
(2006) extend this empirically, and further show that opacity is associated 
with crashes.2 Either implication—higher volatility or crash risk—would 
increase LM estimates if opacity is an issue for the GSEs.
Can we test this hypothesis? Freddie Mac actually provides us with an 
interesting experiment. Before 1993, it was eﬀectively a pure pass-  through 
ﬁ  rm. Figure 6C.1 shows that in this period it held only one mortgage in 
portfolio for every ten mortgages that were securitized and passed through. 
In contrast, even in the pre- 1993 period, Fannie maintained a large portfolio 
of retained mortgages, ﬁ  nanced by issuing debt. After 1993, however, Fred-
die’s retained portfolio rapidly caught up to Fannie’s. Before 1993, therefore, 
Freddie Mac should have exhibited a diﬀerent risk proﬁ  le than Fannie Mae, 
but not after.
To compare the stock market risk of the two ﬁ  rms, I estimated the follow-
ing two- index regression for each ﬁ  rm. Each regression is estimated year- by-
  year using daily data. The coeﬃcient on the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 
measures broad stock market exposure while the coeﬃcient on the return 
on the seven-  year Treasury bond measures interest rate risk (which could 
result from imperfect hedging). Firm-  speciﬁ  c risk is reﬂ  ected in the regres-
sion residual, e, and more particularly, its standard error.
(1)  Ri  a  b RS&P  c R7- year  T- bond  e.
Among the questions we can address with these regressions are the 
following:
￿   Do factor exposures (especially the T-  bond betas) of Freddie (com-
pared to those of Fannie) increase after 1993?
￿   Does Freddie’s residual standard deviation (compared to Fannie’s) 
change after 1993 when it becomes equally “opaque”?
2. In the Jin-  Myers model, the ﬁ  rm may hide an accumulating barrage of negative informa-
tion until it is no longer feasible to do so. At that point, all is revealed to the market at once, 
which results in a stock-  price crash. This seems like a reasonable fear for Freddie and Fannie 
in light of their past accounting practices.158        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
Figures 6C.2 and 6C.3 show the S&P 500 and T-  bond betas for Fan-
nie and Freddie. While there is considerable variation in annual values, the 
overlap in the values for the two ﬁ  rms is remarkable. There clearly is no 
break in the relationship between the two ﬁ  rms in 1993, or for that matter, 
at any other point in the sample. Figure 6C.4 shows the standard errors 
of the regressions for each ﬁ  rm in each year. Again, there is nothing that 
distinguishes one ﬁ  rm from the other. Given the almost identical values for 
both coeﬃcients and the residual standard deviations, it is not surprising 
that plots (not presented here to save space) of R-  squares or of correlation 
coeﬃcients between raw returns and regression residuals are also eﬀectively 
identical for both ﬁ  rms.
These ﬁ  gures are interesting mostly for what they do not show. Until 1993, 
Fannie and Freddie followed signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent risk-  management mod-
els. Freddie Mac bundled and sold virtually all mortgages as mortgage-
  backed securities, retaining only credit risk in return for a guarantee fee. In 
contrast, Fannie Mae held a considerable fraction of mortgages in portfolio, 
thereby adding interest rate risk from imperfect hedging strategies into the 
mix. Despite this, the stock return behavior of the two ﬁ  rms as presented in 
ﬁ  gures 6C.2 through 6C.4 are virtually identical in both the pre-   and post-
 1993  periods.
One might conclude from these ﬁ  gures that the market simply disregarded 
the fact that Fannie had to be riskier in the earlier period. Perhaps in the 
absence of daily information about the eﬃcacy of the hedging program, there 
was no news to which Fannie’s stock price might react. There would then be 
little else to diﬀerentiate the performance of the ﬁ  rms. If so, the nearly identi-
cal regression results in the two periods is consistent with opacity and stock 
Fig. 6C.1    Ratio of debt outstanding to oﬀ balance sheet mortgages securitized and 
sold as mortgage-  backed securities
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price volatility that does not reﬂ  ect all potential risks. This would be bad 
news, for it would suggest that equity (and therefore asset) volatility for the 
purpose of the LM valuation exercise should be greater than that obtained 
from stock price returns or short-  term implied volatilities.
On the other hand, the residual standard errors in ﬁ  gure 6C.4 do not seem 
abnormally low compared to typical ﬁ  rms, nor did Freddie’s fall after 1993 
when it adopted an arguably less transparent business model. Under the 
common interpretation that residual returns proxy for ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c informa-
tion, there is no support for opacity there. The likely impact of opacity is not 
Fig.  6C.2  Coeﬃcient on S&P 500 return in the following regression: Ri  a  
b RS&P  c R7- year  T- bond  e
Note: Regression estimated year-  by-  year using daily return data.
Fig.  6C.3  Coeﬃcient on T-  bond return in the following regression: Ri  a  
b RS&P  c R7- year  T- bond  e
Note: Regression estimated year-  by-  year using daily return data.160        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
easily resolvable, but might at least suggest that the LM valuation numbers 
be taken as conservative. This interpretation also is consistent with the fact 
that they are somewhat lower than Passmore’s midrange estimates.
In the end, however, this may not be the most important question. As 
noted previously, risk management is as important as risk measurement; to 
my mind, the true value of the LM model is as a tool for sensitivity analysis. 
One needs a structural model like theirs to see where the government’s expo-
sures lie, and particularly, what factors may drive potentially rapid changes 
in that exposure.
While it is not the focus of their chapter, their model does oﬀer the oppor-
tunity to think about an interesting question: what would happen to the 
value of the guarantee if Freddie and Fannie were forced to follow Freddie’s 
portfolio strategy of pre-  1993? There is no inherent reason that either ﬁ  rm 
needs to hold signiﬁ  cant amounts of mortgages in portfolio, or that doing so 
strengthens its competitive position. Freddie held few mortgages in portfolio 
until 1993, and its market share actually declined slightly after 1994 when it 
adopted Fannie’s portfolio model.
In a real sense, both ﬁ  rms have acted as a bundle of two distinct business 
lines: one is plain- vanilla securitization, but the other is as an implicit hedge 
fund in which mortgages are held in portfolio and hedged with positions 
in callable bonds and derivatives. While there may be good reasons for the 
government to support the ﬁ  rst activity in the interest of potential spillovers 
to mortgage rates and the housing market, there is no reason to subsidize the 
second. Certainly, a limit on portfolio size would be the easiest way to limit 
and manage the government’s exposure to interest rate risk (but not credit 
risk, since that attaches to securitized as well as held mortgages). Since there 
Fig. 6C.4    Standard deviation of residual return in the following regression: Ri  a 
 b RS&P  c R7- year  T- bond  e
Note: Regression estimated year-  by-  year using daily return data.Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited    1 6 1
seems to be little economic rationale for the portfolio activities, the only cost 
to imposing such limits would most likely be to the shareholders, who would 
forfeit the value of much of their unpaid-  for subsidy.
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